The Failures of Regime Change

A regime change is a covert or overt policy effort, including the use of diplomatic and economic tools, to bring about the replacement of a government in another country. It may include the use of military forces, but does not rise to full-scale war. Unlike the use of force for foreign aid or to counteract a terrorist threat, regime change is intended to remove an illiberal government and replace it with a more pro-American one. Advocates of this tool argue that it can achieve goals more cheaply and quickly than other means, and that it will not spiral into a lengthy state-building mission. Unfortunately, the record shows that these claims are false.

Efforts to overthrow illiberal governments by force are often unsuccessful, stoking anti-American sentiment and fostering blowback in unexpected ways. Even when successful, they usually fail to meet their basic objectives. In a classic case, the US-engineered overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, sowed seeds of Iranian resentment that continue to sprout today. Similar lessons can be drawn from the CIA’s attempts to overthrow Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 and Cuba’s Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.

To avoid the failures that have plagued regime-change operations in the past, American officials need to shift two common mindsets. First, they must acknowledge that regime-change missions are typically long-term and difficult and that it is unwise to pursue them unless a clear set of goals is in mind. Second, they must recognize that forcibly changing a foreign government can damage America’s own security and its relationship with the people of the country they seek to influence.